Sustainable investing: How to do it.  Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚23 | November 2018 by Schoenmaker, Dirk
Dirk Schoenmaker (dirk.
schoenmaker@bruegel.
org), Non-Resident Fellow, 
Bruegel
Executive summary
In the transition to a sustainable economy, companies are increasingly adopting the 
goal of long-term value creation, which integrates financial, social and environmental value. 
Investors have an important stewardship role to steer companies to sustainable business 
practices that will achieve long-term value creation.
Policy proposals from the European Union High Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance, published in January 2018, promote a fiduciary duty to include sustainability in 
investment, company disclosure of sustainability information and a unified classification 
system (or taxonomy) of sustainable investments from which investors can choose. 
A fiduciary duty to include sustainability in the investment process and to disclose 
sustainability information can accelerate sustainable investment.
But an official taxonomy might stifle innovation in sustainable investment. While such a 
taxonomy might bring much needed clarity in certain markets, such as the emerging market 
for green bonds, the general approach to sustainable investment should be market-led. 
Investors and banks are best placed to assess which companies are prepared for the transition 
to a sustainable economy.
This Policy Contribution proposes an active investment approach to sustainable 
investment. This active approach is based on fundamental analysis of companies’ 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and engagement with investee 
companies on material ESG factors. The aim is to uncover and realise companies’ social and 
environmental value alongside their financial value.
Building on previous research (De Jong et al, 2017), we present a six-point plan for 
sustainable investing. These points range from active investment in concentrated portfolios 
and long investment horizons, to deep engagement with companies and shorter investment 
chains.
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1 Introduction
Sustainable investment is gaining momentum in Europe, both among investors and in policy 
circles. Sustainable investment can be defined as a long-term oriented investment approach, 
which integrates environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into the research, 
analysis and selection process of securities within an investment portfolio. Sustainable assets 
under management in Europe have risen from €2.7 trillion (covering 18 percent of total assets 
under management) in 2007 to €11.1 trillion (53 percent) in 2015 (Eurosif, 2016; GSIA, 2017)1. 
Table 1 shows that Europe accounts for more than half of the global market for sustainable 
investments, which amounts to €21.0 trillion. Sustainable investment is less advanced in the 
United States, where materialism is more pronounced2.
Table 1: Proportion of sustainable assets as a share of total assets under 
management (2015)
Region SI assets (in € 
billions) 
Total AUM (in € 
billions)
Proportion SI 
assets(%)
Europe 11,059 21,025 53%
United States 8,012 37,094 22%
Canada 998 2,639 38%
Asia 483 18,583 3%
Australia 474 937 51%
Total 21,026 79,947 26%
Source: Bruegel based on GSIA (2017). Note: SI assets = sustainable assets; AUM = assets under management.
In 2017 the European Commission set up a High Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance 
(HLEG) to investigate how sustainable finance could be promoted in Europe. The High Level 
Expert Group published its final report Financing a Sustainable European Economy in January 
2018 (HLEG, 2018). Based on the HLEG recommendations, the European Commission adopted 
an action plan for sustainable finance with three key elements: a fiduciary duty to include sustain-
ability in the investment process, company disclosure of sustainability information and a unified 
classification system or taxonomy of sustainable investments (European Commission, 2018a).
This Policy Contribution questions the proposed administrative approach to classify-
ing sustainable investments. An official classification system, even with input from leading 
sustainable investors, will lead to rigidities, with cumbersome procedures to include new 
companies and products, and wrong-headed attempts to game the system. Moreover, it might 
set off an active lobby for inclusion, with larger incumbent companies having more levers 
than smaller ‘sustainable’ start-ups.
A market-led approach would be better able to cope with the dynamic field of sustainable 
investment. Institutional investors are well placed to identify frontrunners (and laggards) in 
the transition to a sustainable economy. Schoenmaker (2017) sets out the case for sustainable 
investing – the why question. This Policy Contribution explains how sustainable investment can 
be done. Truly sustainable investment implies a move from passive investment in a market index 
(which can be buttressed with ESG ratings) to active investment in a concentrated portfolio. Fun-
damental analysis of the sustainability of companies’ business models and deep engagement with 
investee companies are key elements of this active approach.
1 The Eurosif study examined trends in the 13 largest European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
2 In societies where materialism is less pronounced (eg Europe), it is easier to move to sustainable investment, 
which combines financial, social and environmental dimensions (Yan et al, 2018).
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2 Long-term value creation
To guide the transformation towards a sustainable and inclusive economy, the United Nations 
developed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 17 concrete sustainable devel-
opment goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015). The private sector has a vital role in reaching these SDGs. 
This is a change from the old mindset about sustainability in which development issues were 
considered to be exclusive ‘government territory’ through regulation and taxation. Compa-
nies are also able to drive progress towards the 17 goals: they have the ability to innovate, to 
scale, to invest and to employ (Tulder, 2018).
The corporate sector can play this important role in achieving the SDGs through long-
term value creation. The concept of long-term value creation means that a company aims to 
optimise its financial, social and environmental value in the long term (Schoenmaker, 2017). 
The optimisation requires careful balancing of the three elements, with none being neglected in 
favour of the others. Unfortunately, current business practices are still too narrowly focused on 
short-term financial returns, meaning that they fail to achieve inclusive capitalism. For decades, 
maximising profits (shareholder view) has been the primary objective in corporate finance. But 
the shareholder model is holding companies back from sustainable business practices.
Recent research argues for a broader corporate objective than shareholder value in a narrow 
sense (eg Hart and Zingales, 2017). The starting point is a distinction between shareholder 
value, which aims for maximisation of financial value only, and stakeholder value, which aims 
for maximisation of integrated value and incorporates social and environmental externalities. 
A key assumption is that these externalities are linked to a company’s operations. Companies 
therefore face a choice in the degree of sustainability in their business model. Investors, as 
shareholders, can guide that choice by their voting at company annual general meetings. 
Table 2: Share of equity held by institutional investors (2016)
Type of institutional investor Amount (in € trillions) Share of equity 
markets
Investment funds 22.8 41.1%
Investment funds (excl. pension funds/insurers) 10.6 19.1%
Pension funds and insurance companies 21.7 39.1%
Traditional institutional investors 32.3 58.2%
Sovereign wealth funds 3.1 5.6%
Hedge funds 0.9 1.6%
Alternative institutional investors 4.0 7.2%
Total institutional investors 36.3 65.4%
Source: Schoenmaker and Schramade (2019). Note: Pension funds and insurers invest directly in equity as well as indirectly via 
investment funds. This indirect investment is deducted from the equity managed by investment funds in the second row to avoid double 
counting. As only data for institutional investors in developed countries is available, the share is calculated as a percentage of developed 
equity markets.
Institutional investors, including pension funds, insurers and investment funds, are driv-
ing sustainable investment. Table 2 shows that they hold about 65 percent of listed equities 
and thus form a strong force in corporate governance. Empirical evidence on institutional 
investors’ ESG strategies shows financial motivations are becoming a more important factor 
behind investors’ push for social and environmental performance (Dyck et al, 2018). There is 
a business case for full ESG integration in investment. Companies that perform well on mate-
rial ESG issues tend to demonstrate a superior financial performance (see for example Khan 
et al, 2016). This is consistent with the idea that strong management of material ESG issues 
brings a real competitive advantage. In a meta-study, Friede et al (2015) found that some 
90 percent of studies find a non-negative relationship between ESG and company financial 
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performance, while the great majority of studies report a positive relationship.
When the objectives of corporations are broadened to optimise their integrated value, 
which combines their financial, social and environmental value, the interests of stakeholders 
are ranked equally. Such a move to the stakeholder model requires new rules for corporate 
governance and decision-making about corporate investments in order to deal with the 
different interests. As set out in Schoenmaker (2017), the net present value rule for investment 
decisions can incorporate social and environmental aspects in its calculation. In terms of cor-
porate governance, sustainability can be included in executive contracts and compensation. 
It is also important to include sustainability in the fiduciary duty of investors to their clients, 
as proposed by the European Commission.
3 Policy proposals
The European Commission’s ‘Financing Sustainable Growth’ action plan aims to promote 
greater investment in longer-term and sustainable activities (European Commission, 
2018a)3. Key elements of the plan include:
1. Establishing an EU classification system for sustainable activities: this taxonomy would 
provide the basis for using the classification system in various areas (eg standards and 
labels for sustainable finance products, differing capital requirements for green and 
brown assets, and sustainability benchmarks);
2. Incorporating sustainability in investors’ duties: this proposal will require institutional 
investors and asset managers to integrate sustainability considerations in the investment 
decision-making process;
3. Strengthening sustainability disclosure: this proposal will strengthen corporate reporting 
on sustainability issues, enabling investors and other stakeholders to better assess 
companies’ long-term value creation and their exposure to sustainability risks.
These elements suggest a dual foundation of the action plan. The public sector would 
take the lead in classifying investments as sustainable, but private investors would be 
required to include those sustainability criteria in their decision-making processes, 
and private companies would have to disclose sustainability information in addition to 
financial information.
On the first element, the Commission (2018b) has published a framework for 
establishing a unified EU classification system for sustainable economic activities, also 
known as the Taxonomy Regulation proposal. In this proposal, whether an economic 
activity qualifies as being environmentally sustainable depends on four requirements:
• The activity must contribute substantially to one of the six EU environmental objectives;
• The activity must not do significant harm to any of the other five EU environmental objectives;
• The activity must comply with minimum social safeguards;
• The activity must comply with technical screening criteria.
The technical screening criteria will determine whether an activity can be considered to 
substantially contribute to one of the environmental objectives and not significantly harm the 
other environmental objectives (see Box 1). While the concept of sustainability has usually 
3 The Commission’s action plan is based on the recommendations of the High Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance (HLEG, 2018). See here for an overview of the Commission’s policies: https://ec.europa.eu/info/busi-
ness-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance_en.
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environmental and social aspects (eg UN, 2015), the Commission has chosen to focus on 
environmental standards and to meet only the minimum social standards of the International 
Labour Organisation, leaving out social goals such as paying a living wage4 and access to edu-
cation and healthcare in low and medium-income countries.
A technical expert group on sustainable finance was set by the European Commission 
in July 2018 to develop the technical screening criteria for the EU taxonomy or classification 
system of environmentally sustainable economic activities. While the technical expert group 
is drawn from the European agencies (the European Environment Agency, the European 
Supervisory Authorities and the European Investment Bank), the private sector, and aca-
demia, it has only an advisory status. The Commission retains final responsibility for adopting 
and amending the technical screening criteria.
Box 1: The EU’s environmental objectives
Article 5 of the proposed Taxonomy Regulation (European Commission, 2018b) lists the 
following environmental objectives:
• Climate change mitigation; 
• Climate change adaptation; 
• Sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources; 
• Transition to a circular economy, waste prevention and recycling; 
• Pollution prevention and control; 
• Protection of healthy ecosystems. 
These environmental objectives are science based. Steffen et al (2015) lists several plane-
tary boundaries, including climate change, biodiversity, land-system change, freshwater use, 
biochemical flows and ocean acidification. Reduced use of biochemical flows (in particular 
phosphorus and nitrogen in agriculture) is part of the fifth objective, while land-system 
change and biodiversity are part of the sixth objective.
The latter two elements of the action plan (incorporating sustainability in investors’ duties 
and strengthening sustainability disclosure) support the broadening of investors’ horizons in 
the direction of long-term value creation, integrating the financial, social and environmental 
aspects. By specifying the obligation for companies to provide sustainability related informa-
tion to investors, sustainability can be fully integrated in private investment decision-making 
and accelerate sustainable investment in Europe, which is already widespread (see Table 1).
But it is not clear why the private sector should follow official guidelines about what con-
stitutes sustainable investment. An official-led classification system might stifle innovation 
in sustainable investment for several reasons. First, the transition to a sustainable economy is 
a dynamic process with creative destruction: new technologies and approaches emerge and 
some of the old ones become obsolete (Schumpeter, 1942). This technological revolution is 
inherently uncertain. It is not clear how regulators can guide that process of transition by label-
ling some companies or projects as “contributing substantially to the sustainability objectives” 
and others not (Article 5 of the proposed Taxonomy Regulation; see Box 1). Private investors 
and banks have a direct incentive to find out which new business models and technologies are 
the most promising in the sustainability transition, as their own money is at stake.
Second, large incumbent companies will lobby the Commission to include current 
business practices as sustainable in the classification system and thus preserve the status 
4 A living wage is a wage for a full-time worker sufficient to provide his or her family’s basic needs for an acceptable 
standard of living. A living wage varies with the local cost of living.
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quo. By contrast, smaller companies, which lack the resources and time for lobbying activ-
ities, are often more innovative in sustainability terms. If they are considered uncertain 
and unproven, new practices might be excluded from the group of sustainable activities in 
the classification system.
Third, administrative obstacles might need to be overcome before new practices can be 
included in the official sustainability definition. That would hamper investment in start-ups 
and small companies that drive and uncover new sustainable business practices.
The example of the adoption of tighter nitrogen oxides and other emissions standards 
for passenger cars is instructive. The European Council has watered down ambitious Euro-
pean Commission and European Parliament attempts to impose tighter standards, after 
intensive lobbying by the car industry5.
While a taxonomy might about bring much needed clarity in certain markets, such as 
the emerging market for green bonds, the general approach towards sustainable investment 
should be market-led. Investors are best placed to see in what way companies are prepared 
for the transition to a sustainable economy.
4 An active investment approach
How can the private sector foster sustainable investment? The internalisation of social 
and environmental externalities is an ongoing process. Some externalities are already in-
ternalised through best business practices at companies, including, for example, energy 
and material savings in the production process and cultivation of an inspired workforce. 
Further externalities might be internalised in the future under pressure from govern-
ments, such as social and environmental regulations and taxes, societal pressure from 
NGOs and consumers, and technological developments, such as low-cost solar and wind 
energy (Schoenmaker, 2017). 
Investors are increasingly using ESG ratings and ESG indices to incorporate the social 
and environmental considerations into the investment process. The advantage of these 
ESG ratings is that they provide investors with a quick approximation of a firm’s ESG 
quality. However, ESG ratings have a number of limitations by design (Schoenmaker and 
Schramade, 2019).
First, ratings focus little on material issues (ie issues that are relevant to the investee 
companies), while it is crucial for investment purposes to focus on material issues. This 
means that a materially negative (and potentially fatal) issue is easily cancelled out by 
high scores on immaterial items, resulting in serious mistakes. An example of a mate-
rial issue for manufacturing is health and safety conditions for the workforce. Second, 
ESG ratings are based on reported data and policies, which is only a fraction of what is 
needed for a good assessment and sometimes can even be contradictory. Moreover, this 
creates biases in scores, for example, in relation to size (as the ratings favour large com-
panies with big sustainability departments). Other firms, especially small ones, might get 
low ratings because they do not put enough information on their policies into the public 
domain, or they get misclassified and compared with the wrong kinds of firms. Third, 
scores are ‘industry neutral’ and based mainly on operations, while taking little account 
of the products and services of the companies in question. This can result in ratings that 
are intuitively wrong, as the least bad companies in very unsustainable industries (say 
coal or tobacco) still get very high scores and can be named sustainability leaders.
5 See for example Julia Fioretti and Waverly Colville, ‘EU parliament says governments delayed new rules on car 
emissions’, Reuters, 28 February 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-eu-
rope/eu-parliament-says-governments-delayed-new-rules-on-car-emissions-idUSKBN167208.
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Hence, it is not surprising to see a lack of correlation in the scores of different ratings agen-
cies. For 1,600 stocks in the MSCI World benchmark, Howard (2016) found a correlation of 26 
percent between the scores assigned by the two largest rating agencies. In sum, ESG ratings 
need to get better. Investors should not accept them as conclusive on a company’s sustaina-
bility quality, but rather as a starting point for analysis. What is more, they should reconsider 
some of their core assumptions to really embed ESG in their investment processes.
Table 3: Sustainable investments by method (2015)
Method Sustainable investments 
(in € billion)
Share (in %)
1. Negative/exclusionary screening 10,163 44%
2. Norms-based screening 5,094 22%
3. Positive/best-in-class-screening 494 2%
4. ESG integration 2,650 12%
5. Corporate engagement 4,275 19%
6. Sustainability-themed investing 145 1%
7. Impact investing 98 0.4%
Total 11,059
Source: Bruegel based on GSIA (2017). Note: The figures do not add up to the total, as some investors combine several methods for 
sustainable investment. Negative/exclusionary screening is the exclusion from a fund of certain sectors or companies based on specific 
ESG criteria; Norms-based screening is screening of investments against minimum standards of business practice based on international 
norms; Positive/best-in-class screening is investment in sectors or companies selected for positive ESG performance relative to industry 
peers; ESG integration is the systematic and explicit inclusion by investment managers of ESG factors into financial analysis; Corporate 
engagement relates to the use of shareholder power to influence corporate behaviour, including through direct corporate engagement 
(ie communicating with senior management and/or boards of companies), filing or co-filing shareholder proposals, and proxy voting that 
is guided by comprehensive ESG guidelines; Sustainability-themed investing is investment in themes or assets specifically related to 
sustainability (for example clean energy, green technology or sustainable agriculture); Impact investing involves targeted investments 
aimed at solving social or environmental problems.
Table 3 reports on sustainable investment methods in Europe. The first three meth-
ods are screening-based and rely on ESG ratings or ESG indices. These methods are used 
for two-thirds of sustainable investments. The remaining four methods rely to some 
extent on an active investment approach. Investing in sustainable companies, defined 
as companies that pursue long-term value creation, requires fundamental analysis of 
their business models and their underlying value drivers (Schramade, 2016). In that way, 
fundamental analysts can assess companies’ social and environmental value, alongside 
their financial value. Such fundamental analysis also allows for an assessment of compa-
nies’ preparedness for the transition to a sustainable economy, based on low-carbon and 
circular concepts. The incorporation of ESG information into stock prices then becomes 
an adaptive process, dependent on the number of fundamental analysts, how they have 
their decisions determined by ESG factors, and the quality of their learning (Lo, 2017).
Busch et al (2016) and Dyllick and Muff (2016), among others, have made the para-
doxical observation that increased sustainable investment had not yet spurred sustain-
able development. There is a need to step up sustainable investment from the current 
ESG approaches that have limited effects to a truly sustainable investment approach 
focused on long-term value creation. This means an active investment approach through 
selecting companies that contribute positively to the SDGs, while avoiding those that 
contribute negatively. New measurement methods are emerging that link the selection 
of companies directly to SDG impact (Schramade, 2017)6.
6 The Erasmus Platform for Sustainable Value Creation, which is a collaboration of Erasmus University and the 
financial sector, is working on the measurement of direct SDG impact; https://www.rsm.nl/erasmus-plat-
form-for-sustainable-value-creation/home/.
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5 A six-point plan for sustainable investing
How can sustainable investing based on an active investment approach be achieved? The short 
answer is that investors should facilitate firms in their long-term value creation processes. The 
longer answer is that investors can realise long-term investment returns by investing in and engag-
ing with companies that are capable of adding value over the long-term, thereby having a positive 
effect on the value of their portfolios and on society (Schoenmaker and Schramade, 2019). 
Investing for long-term value creation combines a long-term strategy aligned with 
achieving the SDGs. The underlying assumption is that the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (UN, 2015) will be, at least partly, achieved; the SDGs are thus relevant for the 
long-term outlook of companies and investors. The incorporation of sustainability into the 
fiduciary duty of institutional investors, as part of the Commission’s action plan (European 
Commission, 2018a), would promote sustainable investment. De Jong et al (2017) distil a 
six-point plan for institutional investors to enable them to pursue sustainable investment 
strategies aimed at long-term value creation (Figure 1 and points 1-6, below). 
Figure 1: Sustainable investment aimed at long-term value creation
Source: De Jong et al (2017).
Point 1: Long investment horizons
With long-term value creation in mind, it does not make sense to buy stocks for periods 
of just a few months or even weeks. Rather, one should buy stocks with a multi-year hori-
zon (5+ years), both in terms of intended holding period and in terms of confidence in the 
sustainability of the business model. It is important to distinguish intended holding periods 
from observed holding periods. The latter might simply be a result of a very passive invest-
ment stance. An active investor could have a very long intended holding period but might still 
decide to terminate a position early based on new long-term information (Edmans, 2017).
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Point 2: Active management of a concentrated portfolio
By its nature, thorough fundamental ESG analysis can be done for a limited number of compa-
nies only, resulting in more concentrated portfolios. Concentrated portfolios contrast the prescrip-
tion of the standard capital asset pricing model that every investor would hold a portfolio of all 
securities available in the market. Statman (2004) shows that a well-diversified stock portfolio needs 
to include just 50 to 100 stocks to eliminate idiosyncratic or unsystematic variance of stock returns. 
There are diminishing benefits of diversification beyond those 100 stocks7. Holding a concentrated 
portfolio allows for the kind of in-depth fundamental ESG integrated analysis that can provide 
an information advantage, with the investor who can first collect information systematically also 
reaping the benefits of this information (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). A concentrated 
portfolio is also a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for effective engagement (point 3).
Point 3: Effective engagement
To be effective, engagement with investee companies should take place over the long-
term, both behind the scenes by meeting with companies and in the annual general meet-
ing by voting (McCahery et al, 2016). This requires human resources, expertise and time. 
By building on the fundamental analysis conducted in the investment process, important 
synergy benefits can be reaped making engagement more effective and efficient than stand-
alone engagement strategies. Early evidence shows that institutional investors have a positive 
impact on companies’ social and environmental performance (Dyck et al, 2018).
Point 4: Performance analysis of value-added in the real economy
Performance analysis based on companies’ value-added in the real economy (both financial 
value and social and environmental value) can, for example, measure a company’s performance 
against specific key performance indicators (KPIs) or a company’s contribution to the global sus-
tainability goals. Nevertheless, the development of these alternative performance measures is still in 
its infancy. By contrast, a passive benchmark strategy (with minimum tracking error) does not allow 
(large) deviations from the market benchmark. Some investors adopt an absolute return target (see 
Box 2). An absolute return is appealing because it is often more closely aligned with the goals of the 
beneficiaries, which are typically to build capital over the long run rather than beat market indices.
Point 5: Long-term alignment of the mandates of asset owner and asset manager
De Jong et al (2017) indicate that asset managers are primarily motivated by their beneficiaries 
(asset owners or clients) to pursue sustainable investment strategies aimed at long-term value cre-
ation, but the incentives in place are often not aligned. The incorporation of sustainability in inves-
tors’ and asset managers’ fiduciary duty will foster the alignment of mandates over the long term.
Point 6: Keep the investment chain short
The investment chain (between parties and within parties) should be kept as short as 
possible because each player in the investment chain adds complexity, and may hold the next 
player accountable to a shorter period. As a result, valuable information might be lost. The 
investment chain is similar to a manufacturing supply chain: outsourcing might bring bene-
fits from specialisation, but also increases vulnerability. 
Illustrating the working of the six points, Box 2 provides an example of a large pension 
fund, Sweden’s Alecta, which applies these points in practice. Alecta’s sustainable investment 
strategy is focused on long-term value creation.
7 Risk management should monitor that the stocks are not overly correlated (reducing their diversification poten-
tial) and are spread over sectors and countries. Moreover, diversification gains are mainly driven by a well-bal-
anced allocation over different asset classes, including equities, bonds and alternative investments (ie real estate, 
private equity, hedge funds, commodities and infrastructure).
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Box 2: Investing for long-term value creation at Alecta
Alecta is a large Swedish pension fund with assets under management of €84 billion in 2017. 
The pension fund adopts a 15 to 20 year perspective on the asset side and applies ESG inte-
gration in its investment process.
Alecta’s asset management model is based on active management of a limited number of 
shareholdings (slightly more than 100 listed shareholdings in 2017). This active management 
is done through independent in-house analysis, focusing on the absolute return and risks 
of investments based on a five-year average. This has significant advantages compared with 
index management. Each investment decision is preceded by a sustainability review of the 
company under consideration. When Alecta invests in a company, it often becomes one of 
the largest shareholders, which enables it to engage in a close dialogue with the company, 
and to influence the company in the desired direction.
Alecta’s total management costs are 0.09 percent of assets under management, of which 
investment management costs are 0.02 percent. Alecta can keep its operating costs very low, 
because it has cut out (expensive) external asset managers and consultants. The asset mix and 
return were as follows at end-2017:
Investments Market value (in 
€ billions)
Share Total return (in %)
2017 2013-2017
Shares 35.1 42% 12.6% 14.1%
Debt securities 42.6 50% 1.0% 3.2%
Real estate 6.6 8% 12.1% 12.5%
Total investments 84.3 100% 6.7% 8.2%
Source: Alecta Annual Report 2017.
6 Conclusions
This Policy Contribution promotes an active investment approach with concentrated portfolios. 
Such a strategy facilitates fundamental analysis of investee companies’ business models and 
their preparedness for the transition to a sustainable economy. This active investment approach 
contrasts with the more passive investment approach followed by the majority of institutional 
investors. These investors buttress their market benchmarks with ESG ratings to improve the 
sustainability of their investments. However, external ESG ratings only contain limited informa-
tion on a company’s true sustainability. There is an analogy with the overreliance on external 
credit ratings for subprime mortgages in the run up to the global financial crisis.
On the policy side, the European Commission’s proposals to incorporate sustainability into 
the fiduciary duty of investors and to require companies to disclose on sustainability issues 
would facilitate an active investment approach (European Commission, 2018a). However, the 
regulatory approach to creating a European taxonomy of sustainable investments could stifle 
innovation. The selection of (emerging) sustainable companies is best left to the market. Inves-
tors find it in their self-interest to follow sustainable investment strategies aimed at long-term 
value creation, provided that the right conditions for such a long-term approach are in place.
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